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PREFACE 
Piracy and terrorist attacks have many similarities but the goals of 
pirates and terrorists are different. Pirates seek financial gain through 
robbery while terrorists seek to make a "political" point by causing 
massive murder and mayhem. Although the goals of pirates and terror-
ists appear to be different, the effects to the environment could be simi-
lar-destruction due to toxic oil and other types of pollution. Further-
more, possible cooperation between pirates and terrorists pose huge 
risks. The goal of this article is to determine how the international 
community can prevent piracy and terrorism. The irony is that perhaps 
piracy may subside at last, but only as a result of the increased efforts of 
the international community to prevent terrorism. The purpose of this 
article, therefore, is to explore the parameters of the problems and 
trends toward serious destruction connected to these acts and to suggest 
that if regional approaches fail, certain unilateral actions against the 
perpetrators may be necessary in order to avoid massive human and en-
vironmental destruction. The core question is whether unilateral action 
growing out of treaty obligations should be permitted. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last three years after September 11, there have been 
many interesting newspaper articles on the intensification of crimes 
committed at sea and the resulting damages stemming therefrom. We 
have chosen three articles from the years 2002, 1 20032 and 20043 as 
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Tankers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2002, at A20. 
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samples. These articles show serious changes in trends which we will 
examine later in the article. 
On December 12, 2002, The New York Times reported that "a re-
cent audio tape believed to have been made by Osama Bin Laden 
praised and seemed to take responsibility for a suicide attack two 
months ago in which a speedboat packed with explosives rammed and 
crippled a French tanker, the Limburg, off Yemen,,"4 and implied that 
these terrorists were interested in cutting the "economic lifelines" of the 
world's industrialized societies.5 The article pointed out that the world 
oil traffic was very vulnerable at a few maritime choke points. For ex-
ample, the Strait of Hormuz accounts for approximately 13 millions of 
barrels of oil each day; the Strait of Malacca accounts for 10.3 million 
barrels; Suez Canal/Sumed Pipeline accounts for 3.8 million barrels; 
Bab el Mandeb accounts for 3 .2-3 .3 million barrels (based on a year 
2000 estimate); and finally, Bosporus accounts for 2 million barrels 
(based on a 2001 estimate). 6 Due to its strategic location, one quarter of 
the world's commercial trade passes through the Strait of Malacca, 
which, in tum, accounts for one "half of all sea shipments of oil, bound 
for East Asia or sometimes the United States, and [for] two-thirds of the 
world's shipment of liquefied natural gas."7 
The article utilized the Strait of Malacca as an example of the vul-
nerability of ships passing in that commercial passageway. After an oil 
tanker had taken on 3 million gallons of gasoline and diesel fuel from 
Singapore, the second busiest port after Hong Kong, it would then pass 
by a "jungle-covered" island (Iyu Kecil) within one hour after its depar-
ture from Singapore.8 The island is supposedly "a base for an organized 
crime gang that has been hijacking smaller tankers to sell the cargos."9 
As the ship continued along that route, which ships normally do, it 
would sail past Laboh Point, Malaysia three hours later. Tankers usu-
ally travel only at 11 knots (i.e., 13 land miles per hour). 10 This route 
through the Strait has its share of pirates who usually attack with high-
2. Keith Bradsher, Attacks on Chemical Ships in Southeast Asia Seem to Be Piracy, Not 
Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at Al 1. 
3. EDITORIAL, Piracy and Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2004, at A14. 
4. Bradsher, supra note 1. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Bradsher, supra note 1. 
10. Id. 
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speed boats. 11 The tankers are seldom armed with anything other than 
fire axes and hoses so as not to aggravate boarding pirates. 12 Many 
companies ban crews from carrying guns or other armaments 13 because 
they believe that the danger to both the crew, itself, and the cargo/ship 
would be greater if they had arms on board. 14 The crew members might 
kill one another or provoke a more violent reaction from the pirates. 
While certain ship owners have begun calling for the formation of small 
military forces, which would patrol the Strait of Malacca, operating un-
der a license from the United Nations, one of the real dangers is that or-
ganized pirates may decide to tip off terrorists with information neces-
sary to destroy tankers and other ships carrying toxic material while in 
ports or in more densely populated areas. 15 The second article to which 
we refer is one that appeared in The New York Times in March 2003. 16 
The attacks on ships carrying chemicals in Southeast Asia were accom-
plished by "pirates," not "terrorists."17 This assertion raises problems 
about certain traditional concepts or norms regarding jurisdictions in 
waters measured outward from the baselines of littoral states-a topic 
that will be covered later in this article. The New York Times reported 
that: 
Any attack on a chemical tanker that resulted in a spill 
could pose difficulties for emergency responders. For one 
thing, owners of chemical tanker ships that carry cargo for 
hire are not always told what the cargo is. The owners are 
sometimes assured in advance that the cargo is safe, only to 
find that it is delivered to the docks by trucks escorted by po-
lice patrols, and is pumped into the ships by people wearing 
hazardous material suits. 18 
The article pointed out that all three chemical tankers attacked in 
the Strait during the month of March 2003 "had followed a standard 
practice in not reporting ... the cargoes of any of the vessels at the time 
they were attacked [to the appropriate agency]."19 Reoccurring avail-
ability of this raises the question of environmental damage control after 
11. Bradsher, supra note 1. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Bradsher, supra note 1. 
17. Bradsher, supra note 2. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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an accident if pirates board a particular chemical tanker and no one 
knows what toxic material is onboard. 
Singapore officials have attempted to discourage attacks and their 
harmful results: "[t]ugboats must now provide six hours' advance warn-
ing of their movements inside Singapore's port."2° Furthermore, all 
small vessels have been ordered not to enter-by day or night- the 
special anchorages for tankers carrying chemicals, crude oil, and highly 
explosive gases like liquefied natural gas.21 Malaysian officials refuse 
to discuss the situation. Most attackers seem to come from the Indone-
sian side of the Strait since there is less vigorous law enforcement on 
that particular side.22 Usually, the small boats that attack these ships are 
too low in the water "to be spotted by the ships' radar and [are] invisible 
in the almost utter darkness except for their navigation lights. "23 
The final article that we have selected for the introduction appeared 
in The New York Times on April 10, 2004.24 The Times reported that 
pirates were allegedly forging links with terrorists.25 Nobody seems to 
know how much piracy is organized and what organization means in 
terms of attacks. According to the article, "tankerloads of crude oil are 
regularly stolen."26 The article is also quick to point out that "a hijacked 
ship carrying a nuclear weapon or radioactive 'dirty bomb' could lay 
waste to a port or block a sea lane like the Strait of Malacca. "27 Appar-
ently, in March 2003, ten armed men seized a chemical tanker off of In-
donesia's coast for the purpose of learning to steer it.28 Prior to that, in 
2002, "163 members of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
agreed ... to measures such as shipboard security officers, ship-to-shore 
alert systems and port security plans."29 One U.S. admiral, at the time, 
told a Congressional committee that the U.S. Navy was considering 
regular patrols in the Strait of Malacca. 30 Since no mention of this idea 
was made during consultations with Malaysian officials, diplomats had 
to "smooth ruffled feathers. "31 Since shipping constitutes eighty percent 
20. Bradsher, supra note 2. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id .. 
24. Piracy and Terrorism, supra note 3. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Piracy and Terrorism, supra note 3. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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of the world trade/commerce, protecting shipping lanes, in both territo-
rial waters and international straits, would seem to be of paramount con-
cern. 32 
The sequencing of the three articles shows that the acts of pi-
racy/terrorism are becoming more serious threats to the international 
community. Once again, we are concerned with the possible toll on 
human life and the environment, if acts of terrorism/piracy cannot be 
prevented. With acts of piracy, we have statistics of past and current 
acts that show the consequences of the pirates' conduct. While we have 
statistics to show past acts of piracy, there are none for acts of terrorism. 
However, the loss of life and damage to the environment are likely to be 
greater in the case of terrorist acts. The wanton destruction of human 
life and the environment appear to be terrorists' goals. But, that is not 
always true. Unintentional loss could occur because tankers and other 
ships carrying chemicals, toxins, etc., could cause severe damage if left 
without crews to steer them; a problem that is likely to develop when 
pirates board a vessel for quick monetary gain and then leave. Terror-
ists may deliberately steer the ship into a populated or environmentally 
sensitive area with the purpose of destroying everything in sight-
creating a "dirty bomb."33 
This article will set forth (a) the dimensions of the current acts of 
piracy/terrorism; (b) the applicable jurisdictional law of the sea; and ( c) 
certain recommendations regarding prevention and law enforcement. 
Let us first turn our attention to the sheer weight of the problem by re-
viewing statistics kept by the International Maritime Bureau. 
I. STATISTICS AND EXAMPLES OF PIRACY AND TERRORISM 
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), maintains a Piracy Re-
porting Center (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.34 Among other 
forms of assistance, the PRC issues reports of piracy and armed robbery 
on the sea on a weekly, quarterly, and annual basis. The IMB, "for sta-
tistical purposes," defines piracy and armed robbery as: 
"An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the ap-
parent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent 
intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act."35 
32. Piracy and Terrorism, supra note 3. 
33. Id. 
34. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMM., INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU, PIRACY AND 
ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT (2003) [hereinafter ICC REPORT 
2002]. 
35. ICC REPORT 2002, supra not 34 at 3. 
5
Diaz and Dubner: On The Problem of Utilizing Unilateral Action To Prevent Acts Of
Published by SURFACE, 2004
6 Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com. [Vol. 32:1 
This definition covers acts of piracy within internal and territorial 
waters. However, the international community has quite a different 
definition of piracy. It is located in Article 101 of the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN CLOS). 36 As we will dis-
cuss later, the difference between the high seas, internal waters, and ter-
ritorial seas, is important when determining who has jurisdiction over 
acts of piracy. Article 101 ofUNCLOS states as follows: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and di-
rected 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 
place outside the jurisdiction of any state; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of 
a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a 
pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an 
act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). 
Armed Robbery against Ships means any unlawful act 
of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat 
thereof, other than an act of ''piracy, " directed against a 
ship or against persons or property on board such ship, 
within a state's jurisdiction over such offenses. 37 
The International Maritime Bureau points out that the International 
Maritime Organization, at its 7 4th meeting of the Maritime Safety 
Committee, addressed this matter of jurisdiction in the Draft Code of 
Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships.38 In the Draft Code, the IMO stated that: "[P]iracy 
36. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, art. 101, S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); 21 l.L.M. 1261, U.N. 
Doc., reprinted in United Nations, the Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, NConf. 62/122 (1982), U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983)[hereinafter 
UNCLOS]. 
37. Id. 
38. See ICC REPORT 2002, supra note 34. 
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means unlawful acts as defined in article 101 of the 1982 United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)."39 According to 
the IMB, these definitions, both the one set forth by the IMB for statisti-
cal purposes and the one which was agreed upon by consensus of the 
international community in UNCLOS now cover actual or attempted at-
tacks regardless of whether the ship is berthed, at anchor, or at sea.40 
The reality of this situation, as we will see later, is that the definition of 
piracy has been greatly expanded. The international community simply 
wanted the definition of piracy to mean piracy on the high seas by one 
private vessel against another.41 It had nothing to do with acts of piracy 
occurring in municipal areas internal waters and territorial sea. Never-
theless, if one or more countries are unwilling or unable to control acts 
of piracy within their waters, the question is whether or not the interna-
tional community can intervene to prevent extensive loss of human life 
and serious damage to the environmental ecosystems of certain regions. 
One of the problems is that while all states realize that commercial 
shipping lanes must be kept free of obstructions, States, at the same 
time, wish to maintain their territorial sovereignty and integrity. This 
will require a balancing of interests which can be accomplished by re-
gional cooperation. But what happens if this regional approach be-
comes inadequate at a given moment? Since the damage and toll on 
human life and the environment resulting from terrorist acts has grown 
more serious, States now have a greater incentive to work harder to con-
trol terrorism. The point to be made here is that the acts of piracy may 
decrease as a result of States' efforts to continue increasing activity in 
an attempt to control acts of terrorism. 
Nevertheless, for purposes of this article, the PRC statistics are 
most valuable. They show that the main problem with both prevention 
and enforcement is caused by inconsistency among the littoral states in-
volved. 
A. Piracy Statistics for 2002 
Starting with the 2002 Annual Report, there were 370 "incidents" 
reported in 2002 compared to 335 in 2001.42 The PRC reported that 
39. International Maritime Organization: Code of Practice for the Investigation of the 
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, adopted Nov. 29, 2001, annex at~ 2.1, 
A 22/Res.922 available at http://www.pmaesa.org/Maritime/Res%20A.922(22).doc (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Draft Code] . 
40. See ICC REPORT 2002, supra note 34. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 16. 
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complacency in taking additional precautionary measures such as a 
strict anti-piracy watch in piracy risk prone areas might have caused a 
marked increase in successful seizure attempts by pirates. Also reported 
was the fact that the number of crews killed during this period declined 
to 10 as compared to 21 in 2001. 43 There were 24 crew members and 
passengers missing. The number of attacks involving knives rose from 
105 to 136 in 2002. There was also a substantial increase in hijackings 
from 16 to 25 incidents. Many of these hijackings reported involved the 
taking of smaller boats, such as tugs, barges and fishing boats, in the 
Malacca Strait and in the Asian waters. This is because the syndicates 
in the area may be targeting ships, tugs, and barges carrying valuable 
palm oil and "gas oil." Indonesia reported the highest number of attacks 
with 103 reported incidents, and that sum equaled more than one quarter 
of the world's piratical attacks. Indonesian waters remained the highest 
risk area because no serious attempts to address the particular problem 
had taken place in 2002. Other areas of concern were Bangladesh and 
India. Piracy attacks in Bangladesh were ranked second highest and In-
dia dropped to the third spot with 18 attacks. This is attributed to in-
creased patrols in Indian waters which had reduced attacks from 27 in 
the year 2001 to 18 in the year 2002. The Malacca Strait recorded 16 
and 14 attacks respectively. That number had dropped compared to 
2001. Malaysian authorities were apparently maintaining more vigilant 
and constant patrols in the Strait.44 
B. Maritime Terrorism During 2002 
Shipping is vulnerable to terrorism because it is necessary to verify 
the contents of the containers in order to ensure "the security of con-
tainers in transit, the identity of crew members on board the vessels, the 
transportation of biological and chemical weapons against vessels and 
their use, such as weapons." 45 
As was pointed out earlier, on October 6, 2002, terrorists attacked 
the French super-tanker MT Limburg. The attack was carried out when 
a small boat packed with explosives rammed into the tanker causing ex-
tensive damage. In addition to one crewmember death, some 90,000 
barrels of oil were released into the Gulf of Aden waters off the shore of 
Yemen. It is pointed out in the actual report that this kind of attack is 
difficult to prevent because no shipboard responsive action can protect 
the ship in these circumstances. Why? Because these are slow vessels 
43. ICC REPORT 2002, supra note 34. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 22. 
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with restricted maneuverability. It's therefore impossible for the vessel 
to avoid a fast moving boat intent on collision. The IMB recommended 
that the coastal state ensure that the approaches to their port are secure, 
by having the local port authority specify approach channels for tankers 
and other vulnerable vessels.46 
These channels, and the areas on each side of them, 
should be monitored by coast- guard or police vessels to en-
sure that no small craft, leisure, fishing or unauthorized ves-
sel enters this restricted zone. This is called making a 
'clearway' through which authorized vessels can navigate 
without the fear that a small vessel close to the fairway will 
suddenly project itself towards it at high speed.47 
In addition, during 2002, the PRC reported that the FBI issued 
warnings that divers could be used to attack ocean vessels. They could 
attach explosives to the hulls. The FBI believed that there were plans to 
target the global retroleum sector by conducting maritime attacks 
against oil vessels.4 
C. Piracy Statistics and "New Brand of Piracy" in 2003 
On May 6, 2003, it was reported by the PRC that "pirate attacks on 
ships have trifled in the last decade with a reported 103 attempts" in the 
first quarter.4 For purposes of reporting, geographic areas were divided 
into sectors: i.e., Red Sea/Gulf of Aden ( 6 incidents); Nigeria (9); Bang-
ladesh (9); India (9); and, Indonesia, the most dangerous waters with 28 
attacks in the first quarter.50 The report continued, "[A] total of 145 
seafarers were reported killed, assaulted, kidnapped or missing in the 
first quarter of 2003, with bulk carriers nominated as the vessels most 
likely to face attack." 51 
The ICC Commercial Crime Services reported that on September 
2, 2003, gangs of heavily armed pirates used fishing and speed boats to 
46. ICC REPORT 2002, supra note 34. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 24. 
49. Pirate Attacks Have Tripled In A Decade, IMB Report Finds, ICC INT'L MAR. 
BUREAU, May 1, 2003, at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2003/stories/piracy-
quarter-1.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2004 ). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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target small oil tankers in the Malacca Strait. 52 These attacks followed a 
pattern which had been set by Indonesian Aceh rebels. This was the 
first time that the IMB had discussed "political piracy. "53 It was pointed 
out by the IMB that in late July 2003, there were three attempted board-
ings in less than a week off the Sumatra coast in the Malacca Strait. Pi-
rates fired automatic weapons at gas and oil tankers. However, on each 
occasion, preventive measures deployed by the crew thwarted the at-
tack. An example of the following act of piracy was given: "the Malay-
sian registered tanker Penrider was carrying 1,000 tonnes of fuel oil 
aboard when she was attacked some 12 miles from Port Klang, Malay-
sia." Apparently, the ship was on route from Singapore to Penang when 
a fishing boat containing 14 pirates armed with AK-47 and M-16 assault 
rifles intercepted the ship, took hosta~es, and later released them un-
harmed after successful negotiations. 5 The Malaysians believed that 
the modus operandi was similar to that of an Aceh group thought to 
have been responsible for many other such attacks along the Strait of 
Malacca. 55 The problem with the escalation in "political" piracy (politi-
cally motivated terrorists and pirates) is that they will take greater risks 
in order to further their cause. 56 The greater risk could lead to untold 
environmental damage. On October 31, 2003, the IMB again warned of 
a strong possibility of political attacks on gas tankers and chemical 
tankers by pirates/terrorists that could lead to major environmental dis-
aster. 57 The numbers of acts of piracy throughout the world had 
"reached a record 344 in the first nine months of 2003, with Indonesian 
waters remaining the most dangerous. "58 
The IMB report said, 
A spate of attacks against small tankers in the Malacca 
Strait by gangs of heavily armed pirates aboard fishing boats 
and fast craft has heightened tension in the area. These have 
led to repeated warnings from the IMB and its Piracy Report-
52. International Chamber of Commerce, New Brand of Piracy Threatens Oil Tankers 
in Malacca Straits, Sept. 2, 2003, available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/news-archives/2003/piracy_ms.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. International Chamber of Commerce, Concerns Grow As Pirates Attack Tankers, 
Oct. 31, 2003, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/news_archives/2003/piracy-Oct-
2003.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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ing Centre, which fear an environmental disaster in these re-
stricted waters if a larger tanker is subjected to the same type 
of attack. 59 
D. Report of "Jane's Defence Weekly" (March 31, 2004)6° 
As a final note to the number of incidents reported, Jane's pointed 
out that in 2003 there were 445 incidents reported, compared with 370 
in 2002 (obtaining its figures from the IMB). Southeast Asia/Far East 
showed an increase in reported incidents from 170 to 189; Africa/The 
Red Sea, showed an increase from 78 to 93; The Indian subcontinent 
showed an increase from 52 to 87; and The Americas showed an in-
crease from 65 to 72.61 Although the attacks in the Strait of Malacca 
were up from 16 to 28, almost all of these incidents occurred in Indone-
sian waters due to the fact that the Malaysian authorities, particularly 
the Royal Malaysian Marine Police, started to use vigilant patrols and 
constant operations in order to prevent them. 
The number of attacks involving guns rose to 100 in 2003 from 68 
in 2002, while the number of hostages taken almost doubled to 359.62 
Ships were boarded in 311 instances and a total of 19 
ships were hijacked. Indonesian waters continue to be the 
most piracy-prone with 121 reported incidents in 2003, fol-
lowed by Bangladesh with 58 attacks and Nigeria with 39. 
Attacks off Nigeria almost tripled compared with the previ-
ous year, making the Nigerian waters the most dangerous in 
Africa for attacks on shipping. 63 
As will be discussed later, there were two important trends pointed 
out by Jane's. First, although the hijackings of merchant vessels (as op-
posed to tugs and barges) ceased during 2003,64 hijackings which did 
occur fell into two main categories: "military-style operations by mili-
59. International Chamber of Commerce, supra note 56 .. 
60. Richard Scott, Increased Piracy Makes High Seas More Dangerous, JANE'S 
DEFENCE WEEKLY, Mar. 31, 2004, at 1, at 
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKev-/contentl/janesdata/mags 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2004). 
61. ICC COM. CRIME SERVICES, Piracy Takes Higher Toll of Seaman 's Lives, Jan. 28, 
2004, at 1, at http://www.iccbo.org/ccs/news-archives/2004/Piracy_report_2003.asp (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2004). 
62. Scott, supra note 60, at 2. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
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tant groups seeking to hold crew members for ransom ... " and attacks 
against soft targets such as tugs and barges. The problem, of course, is 
that those tankers that carry dangerous cargoes, could fall temporarily 
under the control of unauthorized and unqualified individuals who, in 
tum, might cause great environmental and safety problems. 65 
Second, there was an increase in coordinated attacks which in-
volved the use of several boats simultaneously, especially in Indonesian 
waters which form part of the Malacca Strait as well as Bintan Island. 
The attackers approached a target ship from different locations and 
sprayed the superstructure with gunfire in an attempt to get the vessel to 
stop.66 
Before leaving the subject of statistics and trends, the IMB re-
ported on February 13, 2004, that "four crew members of an oil tanker 
were shot dead by pirates in the Malacca Strait off Indonesia's war-tom 
Aceh province" during the prior week after the owner failed to pay ran-
som for their release.67 This incident would tend to show that the pi-
rates/terrorists are becoming more brazen in their approach in dealing 
with ship owners which could, in tum, produce greater loss of human 
life and greater danger to the environment. 68 
Although we can see the numbers of incidents of piracy/terrorism 
is on the rise in certain geographic areas, the question remains of what 
the international community can do to prevent serious danger to human 
life and the environment. In order to discuss security measures and en-
forcement, it is necessary first to set forth the jurisdictional issues in-
volved. Without a thorough understanding of the jurisdictional parame-
ters, it would be difficult to understand the current "norms" in 
international law. 
II. CONSENSUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REGARDING A 
DEFINITION OF THE TERM "PIRACY"-INTERNATIONAL LAW VERSUS THE 
CURRENT SITUATION 
We have been using the term "piracy" throughout the earlier part 
of this article. 69 It was also pointed out that the definition of piracy un-
der conventional wisdom was different from that of the statistical re-
65. Scott, supra note 60, at 2. 
66. Id. 
67. International Chamber of Commerce, Murder of Four Sailors Marks Violent Start 
to Shipping Year 2004, Feb. 13, 2004, at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2004/aceh.asp. (last visited Oct. 31, 2004). 
68. Id. 
69. ICC REPORT 2002, supra note 34. 
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porting of the IMB. 70 The problem is that piracy under classical inter-
national law has presented different types of dangers during earlier cen-
turies. Under international law, UNCLOS, these acts of piracy occur on 
the high seas, not in the territorial/internal waters of a coastal state.71 In 
order to understand the narrowness of the international definition of "pi-
racy," it is necessary to understand certain jurisdictional terms. After 
looking at certain norms of international law with regard to the law of 
internal and territorial waters, straits and environmental standards, it 
will be obvious why certain treaty provisions will be ineffective against 
acts of piracy occurring in the waters of coastal states. The conven-
tional crime (UNCLOS) of "piracy" is an act of violence, depredation, 
or detention committed for private ends, delegated to the high seas, and 
committed by one private ship against another ship.72 Terrorism (an act 
committed for political ends) can occur on land or sea, while maritime 
violence or crimes at sea (generic, all-encompassing terms) can only oc-
cur at sea73 (transportation of slaves). In order to understand this better, 
it is necessary to discuss these terms. The reader will then understand 
why enforcement or prevention of these crimes is hampered by prob-
lems relating to sovereignty. This article includes a schematic jurisdic-
tional diagram which has been drawn for the purpose of this analysis. 74 
The coastal state exercises the utmost jurisdiction over 
its land territory. Every coastal state has a baseline which is 
used to measure the state's diminishing jurisdiction as one 
moves seaward. The coastal state exercises exclusive juris-
diction over its ports and harbors (with possible access to 
visiting ships). As one moves seaward from the baseline, the 
state exercises almost total jurisdiction over its territorial sea 
(except for the doctrine of innocent passage) which is meas-
ured twelve miles seaward from its baseline. The state's ju-
risdiction diminishes further when the contiguous zone, 
which extends for twelve miles beyond the territorial waters, 
reaches the high seas. The contiguous zone is a area of lim-
ited jurisdiction of the coastal state (e.g., navigation, sanita-
tion, customs, fiscal) and is actually part of the high seas. 
The high seas are open to all nations and therefore the coastal 
70. ICC REPORT 2002, supra note 34. 
71. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 36. 
72. Id. at art. 101. 
73. ICC REPORT 2002, supra note 34. 
74. See Appendix A for a descriptive jurisdictional chart. 
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state is not allowed to exercise its jurisdiction in this area 
(with limited exceptions, e.g., the exclusive economic zone). 
The high seas have been traditionally open to all nations 
for the purpose of preserving international shipping and 
commerce. International straits are also preserved for inter-
national commerce and are therefore open to all nations. The 
flow of international commerce is at the heart of all major 
maritime conventions and concerns regarding [piracy, terror-
ism and other] maritime violence. Commerce must be able 
to flow freely, uninhibited, without danger to life and limb 
and without the fear of loss to human life or of widespread 
environmental contamination. 75 
At this point it is necessary to define piracy under treaty law. 
A. Definitions 
"Piracy" is defined in the [UNCLOS] as follows: 
Article 101 
Definition of piracy 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and di-
rected: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 
place outside the jurisdiction of any state; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of 
a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge or facts making it a 
pirate-ship or aircraft; 
( c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an 
act described in subparagraph (a) or (b ). 
75. Barry Hart Dubner, Human Rights and Environmental Disaster-Two Problems 
That Defy the "Norms" of the International Law of Sea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J. lNT'L L. & 
COM. 1, 11-13 (1997)( citing UN CLOS, supra note 36). 
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Article 102 
Piracy by a warship, government ship or government 
aircraft whose crew has mutinied 
The acts of piracy, as defined in Article 101, committed 
by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose 
crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft 
are assimilated to acts committed by a private ·ship or air-
craft. 
Article 103 
Definition of a pirate ship or aircraft 
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if 
it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used 
for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in 
article 101. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been 
used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the 
control of the person guilty of that act. 
Article 104 
Retention or loss of the nationality of a pirate ship or aircraft 
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it 
has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of 
nationality is determined by the law of the state from which 
such nationality was derived. 
Article 105 
Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the juris-
diction of any state, every state may seize a pirate ship or air-
craft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the con-
trol of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property 
on board. The courts of the state which carried out the sei-
zure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may 
also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, 
aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties act-
ing in good faith. 
15
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Article 106 
Liability for seizure without adequate grounds 
Where seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of pi-
racy has been effected without adequate grounds, the state 
making the seizure shall be liable to the state the nationality 
of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or 
damage caused by the seizure. 76 
Prior thereto, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas de-
fined "piracy" as follows: 
Article 13 
Every state shall adopt effective measures to prevent 
and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly 
its flag, and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that 
purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, what-
ever its flag, shall ipso facto be free. 
Article 14 
All states shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent 
in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other 
place outside the jurisdiction of any state. 
Article 15 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
( 1 )Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of dep-
redation, committed for private ends by the crew or the pas-
sengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(a )On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
b )Against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any state; 
(2)Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a 
ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pi-
76. Dubner, supra note 75, at 11-15 (citing UNCLOS, supra note 36). 
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rate ship or aircraft; 
(3)Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this arti-
cle. 
Article 16 
The acts of piracy, as defined in article 15, committed 
by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose 
crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft 
are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship. 
Article 17 
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if 
it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used 
for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in 
article 15. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been 
used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the 
control of the persons guilty of that act. 
Article 18 
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it 
has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of 
nationality is determined by the law of the state from which 
such nationality was derived. 
Article 19 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the juris-
diction of any state, every state may seize a pirate ship or air-
craft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pi-
rates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. 
The courts of the state which carried out the seizure may de-
cide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also deter-
mine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft 
or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in 
good faith. 77 
The basic question for jurisdictional purposes is: What significance 
77. Dubner, supra note 60, at 15-16 (citing Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962), 450 U.N.T.S. 82). 
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piracy, terrorism and other forms of maritime violence have in the law 
of nations? The answer to this question is simple and is contained in the 
58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Report of the 
Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea.18 Basically, after 
setting forth the seriousness of the global challenges it was pointed out 
by the United Nations that the main concern is to develop international 
co-operation and coordination in order to have effective action. Indeed, 
certain regions have identified this need and given priority for regional 
cooperation by strengthening exchange of information, personnel, train-
ing, as well as enhanced capacity/building and joint research. 79 While 
the crimes at sea include international terrorism, transnational organized 
crime, illicit drug trafficking, the jurisdictional problem presented is to 
have coastal states act to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and terror-
ism against shipping. In order to do this, the Report points out that, in 
connection with the prevention and suppression of acts of piracy and 
terrorism against shipping, it is important to maintain a balance between 
the need to take protective measures to counter the threat to maritime 
security on the one hand, and the need to respect international law, in 
particular, human rights, on the other. "A balance must also be sought 
between tightening security measures and maintaining the efficient flow 
of international trade."80 
Due to the fact that jurisdictional questions may arise because 
many of these acts of piracy/terrorism can and will occur in inter-
nal/territorial seas, the question of how one maintains tighter security 
measures without interfering in the efficient flow of international trade 
could present numerous problems unless the states work together. 
Therefore, it is necessary to set forth the security measures, both old and 
new, that were set forth in order to protect the safe passage of maritime 
transport. As one reads the recommendations of the General Assembly, 
the one item that will stand out is the trend toward more violence and 
catastrophic problems that could occur if proper planning and reactions 
were not forthcoming. 
78. Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 
58th Sess., Agenda Item 53(a), U.N. Doc. NRES/58/65 (2003), available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/266/68/PDF/N0326668.pdf?OpenElement 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General 2003]. 
79. Id. at 33 
80. Id. 
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III. CURRENT MEASURES UTILIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY TO PREVENT PIRACY /TERRORISM 
A. Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping 
In Resolution 57 /141, the General Assembly welcomed initiatives 
of the IMO, including the adoption of amendments to SOLAS and the 
International Maritime Security Code at the Conference of Contracting 
Parties to SOLAS that was held in December 2002 and will enter into 
force in July 2004.81 The Code' s purpose is to provide a standardized, 
consistent framework for evaluating risk and enabling governments to 
assess threats in terms of vulnerability of ships and port facilities. Also 
included in a chapter entitled Modifications to Chapter V (Safety of 
navigation) of SOLAS, there is contained "a new timetable for the fit-
ting of Automatic Information Systems (AIS)."82 As an example, the 
United States now requires detailed cargo manifests for the loading of 
containers bound for its ports, the purpose of which is to check the ma-
jor changes of loading of containers in major ports such as Hong 
Kong. 83 "A new regulation 115 requires ships to be issued with a Con-
tinuous Synopsis Record (CSR), which is intended to provide an on-
board record of the history of the ship. "84 The CSR must be issued by 
the Administration and contain information such as the names of the 
ship and the flag state, the date on which the ship was registered with 
that state, the ship's identification number, the port at which the ship is 
registered and the name of the registered owner(s) and their registered 
address. Any changes have to be recorded in the CSR within three 
months so as to provide updated and current information together with 
the history of the changes.85 As far as security under SOLAS is con-
cerned, a new special chapter (Chapter XI-2), requires that the flag 
states and coastal states have to conduct security assessments for their 
ships or port facilities, within their territory that serve ships engaged in 
international voyages, pursuant to which a security plan is then devel-
oped. 
In addition, the General Assembly also urged states to become par-
ties to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) and its Protocol, and 
invited states to participate in the review of those instruments by the 
81. Report of the Secretary-General 2003, supra note 78, at 34. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 33. 
84. Id. at 34. 
85. Id. at 34. 
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Legal Committee of the IMO to strengthen the means of combating 
such unlawful acts, including terrorist acts. 86 
B. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships-A Current Assessment 
of the Problems by the General Assembly 
After looking at the number of incidents of piracy in Resolution 
57 /141, the General Assembly again urged all states and relevant inter-
national bodies to cooperate in preventing and combating piracy and 
armed robbery at sea by adopting measures to assist with prevention, 
reporting and investigating incidents, and to bring the alleged perpetra-
tors to justice, in accordance with international law. With the adoption 
of national legislation, along with the training of seafarers, port staff and 
enforcement personnel, and provisions of enforcement vessels and 
equipment to guard against fraudulent ship registration, 87 states would 
be better able to prevent and combat piracy and armed robbery. 
On March 22, 2004, the United Nations prepared a report on "the 
request of the General Assembly in paragraph 78 of its Resolution 
58/240 of December 23, 2003, for the Secretary-General to present at 
the fifty-ninth session his annual comprehensive report on develop-
ments and issues relating to oceans and the law of the sea. "88 This re-
port pointed out with regard to prevention and suppression of acts of 
terrorism against shipping, that: 
158. A new comprehensive maritime security regime for in-
ternational shipping contained in several amendments to 
SOLAS will enter into force on July 1, 2004. The new re-
gime includes the International Ship and Port Facility Secu-
rity (ISPS) Code, Part A which is mandatory and Part B, 
which is voluntary. Flag states will be required to issue a 
Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) to ships flying their flag, 
designed to provide an on-board record of the history of the 
ship with its name, flag State, the date on which the ship was 
registered with that State, the ship's identification number, 
the port at which the ship is registered and the name of the 
registered owner( s) and their registered address. In Decem-
86. Report of the Secretary-General 2003, supra note 78, at 34. 
87. Id. at 34-5. 
88. Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-Genera/, U.N.C.L.O.S. 
59th Sess., Agenda Item 51(a), summary, U.N. Doc. A/59/62 (2004), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly/general_assembly_reports.htm (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-Genera/ 2004]. 
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ber 2003, the IMO Assembly adopted a format and guide-
lines for the maintenance of the CSR [by] resolution 
A.959(23). 
159. Under the ISPS Code, all ships must be provided with a 
ship security alert system according to a strict timetable re-
quiring most vessels to be fitted by 2004 and the remainder 
by 2006. Ships must be able to present to port State control 
officers an International Ship Security Certificate which pro-
vides evidence that the ship conforms to the new security re-
quirements. If the coastal State has clear grounds for believ-
ing that the ship is not in compliance, it may either require 
the ship to rectify the non-compliance or proceed to a loca-
tion specified in its territorial sea or internal waters; or it may 
inspect the ship if it is in its territorial sea; or deny its entry 
into port. A ship can only be denied entry into port or be ex-
pelled therefrom if there are clear grounds for believing that 
the ship poses an immediate threat to the security or safety of 
persons, or of ships or other property, and there are no ap-
propriate means for removing the threat. In such cases the 
authorities of the port State should communicate the relevant 
facts to the authorities of the State of the next port of call, 
and to other potentially affected coastal States. Ships that are 
unduly delayed or detained are entitled to compensation for 
any loss or damage suffered. The new amendments also ap-
ply to port facilities where there is a ship/port interface. The 
wider issue of the security of port areas has been the subject 
of collaboration between IMO and ILO, resulting in a Code 
of Practice on Security in Ports which has been submitted to 
the Governing Board of ILO for approval in March 2004. 
The Code extends the consideration of port security beyond 
the area of port facility into the whole port. It is intended to 
be compatible with the provisions of the ISPS Code and ad-
dresses port security policy, assessment and plans as well as 
related tasks and roles, and security awareness and training, 
which are vital for the successful implementation of an ap-
propriate port security strategy. 
160. Modifications to Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) of 
SOLAS containing a new timetable for the fitting of Auto-
matic Identification Systems (AIS) will enter into force on 
December 31, 2004. Ships of less than 50,000 gross ton-
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nage, other than passenger ships and tankers, will have to fit 
AIS by that date. The Subcommittee on Safety of Naviga-
tion (NA V) is developing functional requirements for the 
long-range identification and tracking of ships. It has been 
suggested that coastal states be permitted to identify and 
track ships up to 200 nm miles offshore. 
161. The General Assembly in its resolution 58/240 once 
again urged States to become parties to the Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Mari-
time Navigation (SUA Convention) and its Protocol, invited 
them to participate in the review of those instruments by the 
IMO Legal Committee (LEG) and urged them to take appro-
priate measures to ensure in the effective implementation, in 
particular through the adoption of legislation aimed at ensur-
ing a proper framework for responses to incidents of armed 
robbery and terrorist acts at sea. The Committee continued 
its consideration of a draft protocol to the SUA Convention 
and its Protocol in October 2003, focusing on draft article 
3bis introducing new offenses and on draft article 8bis on 
boarding provisions. While the Committee seemed to accept 
the need to include provisions concerning boarding in the 
draft protocol, albeit with substantial modifications to the 
current draft, no agreement was reached on whether provi-
sions on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) should be in-
cluded. Delegations believed that the master and the crew 
should be protected from prosecution where under normal 
circumstances they would have no control over and were ig-
norant of the reasons for the transport of substances carried 
on board.89 
With regard to piracy and armed robbery against ships, the same 
report stated: 
163. The number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, reported from 1984 (when IMO began keeping 
records) to the end of March 2003, has risen to 3, 041. Ac-
cording to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), during 2003 the 
89. Report of the Secretary-General 2004, supra note 88 at 39-40. 
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number of incidents increased to 445 actual and attempted at-
tacks, from 3 70 in 2002. Violence also rose, with 21 seafar-
ers killed, 40 assaulted and 88 injured. The number of hos-
tages nearly doubled, to 359. Ships were boarded 311 times 
and 19 ships were hijacked. [IMB] believes that kidnapping 
of crew are largely the work of militia groups in politically 
vulnerable areas. 
164. Reports indicate that the areas most affected were the 
Far East, in particular the South China Sea and the Malacca 
Strait, South America and the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean 
and West and East Africa. Indonesia continues to record the 
highest number of attacks with 121 reported incidents in 
2003. Piracy attacks in Bangladesh ranked second highest 
with 58 attacks and Nigeria ranks third with 39 attacks. 
There were 28 incidents in the Malacca Straits. Most of the 
attacks worldwide were reported to have taken place in terri-
torial waters while the ships were at anchor or berthed. 
165. In resolution 58/240, the General Assembly again urged 
states to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea by adopting 
measures, including those relating to assistance with capac-
ity-building through training of seafarers, port staff and en-
forcement personnel and by adopting national legislation, as 
well as providing enforcement vessels and equipment and 
guarding against fraudulent ship registration. It also urged 
States to promote, conclude and implement cooperation 
agreements, in particular at the regional level and in high-
risk areas. The 10 States members of the Association of 
South-East Asian Nations and China, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka are negotiating a re-
gional cooperation agreement on combating piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in Asia. 
166. IMO has also been promoting the conclusion of regional 
agreements/Memoranda of Understanding on the prevention 
and suppression of piracy and armed robbery in the contest 
of the regional meetings it has convened as part of its anti-
piracy project. The Maritime Safety Committee at its 77th 
session endorsed the sub-regional/regional meetings con-
vened by the secretariat and expert missions to other regions 
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of the world; and agreed that IMO should continue to take 
the lead in the development of regional cooperation activities 
and agreements/arrangements. 90 
While these Reports are technically instructive, it is important to 
look at prior discussions within the international community in order to 
see how the problems of piracy/terrorism, and trends related thereto, 
have changed since September 11. One could ask themselves: Are 
these discussions really addressing possible acts of terrorism that could 
occur within today's communications and weapons systems? 
IV. ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PIRACY/TERRORISM PROBLEM 
In order to get a better idea of the number of piratical and armed 
robbery incidents against ships, the General Assembly at its 56th ses-
sion, in Resolution 56/12 on "Oceans and the Law of the Sea," identi-
fied the following problems (although not applicable in all participating 
countries):91 
[T]he continuing economic situation prevailing in cer-
tain parts of the region; the geographical configuration of 
certain countries; the resource constraints on law enforce-
ment agencies; the lack of communication and cooperation 
among the various national agencies involved; the response 
time after an incident had been reported to the coastal state 
concerned by affected ships; general problems of incident 
reporting, such as alerting the nearest coastal states and other 
ships in the area of a ship under attack or threat of attack; 
and, the prosecution of pirates and armed robbers when ap-
prehended; together with the lack of regional cooperation.92 
This information was gathered at what was known as the Singa-
pore meeting. The solutions, offered to address the problems that ex-
isted at that time, were basically that local coastal states identify vulner-
able areas off their coasts and in their ports and direct resources to cope 
with the increased risks to safe navigation and environmental protection 
90. Report of the Secretary-General 2004, supra note 88, at 41-2. 
91. See id. 
92. Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General U.N.C.L.O.S. 
56th Sess., Agenda Item 42(a), at 39, U.N. Doc. A/56/58 (2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly_reports.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) 
[hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General 2001]. 
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in such areas with particular emphasis being placed on areas used by in-
ternational shipping. In addition, states were to provide specific advice 
for ships on protective measures and local reporting procedures, to pro-
vide coordinated patrols and joint exercises, where appropriate; and, to 
test existing anti-piracy systems and strengthen regional cooperation. It 
was also urged at the Singapore meeting that governments, who had not 
yet ratified the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Navigation (SUA Convention) and the 1988 Proto-
col for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (the SUA Protocol), might 
consider doing so. At that time, there were 52 states who were parties 
to the 1988 Convention, representing 48% of the world tonnage; and, 48 
states who were parties to the Protocol.93 
Of special interest to the General Assembly was the creation of a 
uniform policy to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed rob-
bery, as well as to sensitize countries in the affected areas, and to take 
action by assisting or providing resources to do so.94 The lack of in-
creased awareness by coastal states was the key to the problem of pi-
racy. At the time of this General Assembly paper, pirates fell generally 
into two categories: (1) poor, opportunistic people; and (2) professional 
pirates.95 As the reader will see later in this article, pirates now seem to 
be better organized. In addition, we now have the problem of terrorism 
and the possible coordinated efforts by pirates and terrorists, which have 
heightened the dangers of transit by commercial shipping, together with 
the loss of human life and possible environmental disasters that would 
ensue. At this particular meeting of the General Assembly, recommen-
dations for combating piracy at that time included preventive measures 
by the crew; namely, (1) distributing IMO circulars providing guidance 
in this respect; (2) industry initiatives creating a piracy reporting center 
(which of course is in effect today); (3) a model law developed by the 
Comite Maritime International which may assist in answering some of 
the problems; (4) use of technology, tracking devices costing less than 
$300 per month which can be hidden on board a ship; (5) a proactive 
approach by coastal and flag states, (For example, if a coastal state is 
unable or unwilling to prosecute pirates then the flag state should have 
a role to play) (emphasis added); (6) regional cooperation, such as, joint 
patrols which have proven to be deterrents; and, (7) intergovernmental 
involvement with the possibility of creating an international task force. 
93. Report of the Secretary-General 2001, supra note 92, at 41-2. 
94. Id. at 42. 
95. Id. at 43. 
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Regarding cooperation at the global level, it was suggested that the IMO 
draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy Against 
Ships should be adhered to by states involved.96 
In summarizing the main problem areas with respect to piracy and 
armed robbery at sea at that time, the main problem was the lack of 
communication and cooperation among the various national agencies 
involved in a country (the reader will observe that this problem was 
prevalent before September 11 in the United States and may still be a 
problem).97 Additionally, the response time was slow and, in some 
cases, totally lacking, after the incident had been reported to the relevant 
coastal state by affected ships. And, finally, there were general prob-
lems of incident reporting, many ship owners did not want to report 
these acts so that their business would not be affected by customers 
seeking to utilize their ships for the carrying of cargo. 
Other problems, which were tangential to the main problems as 
perceived at that time included the lack of timely and proper investiga-
tion into reported incidents; the prosecution of pirates and armed rob-
bers when apprehended; and the lack of significant regional cooperation 
among maritime law enforcement authorities in affected countries.98 
Finally, the continuing economic situation prevailing in certain parts of 
the region; the geographical configuration of certain countries; and the 
resource constraints on law enforcement agencies created additional 
problems.99 
The overall problem is that armed robbery, taking place in territo-
rial seas of coastal states, in international straits, and in archipelagic wa-
ters could threaten the rights of innocent passage and transit passage, 
which is enjoyed by all states under the UNCLOS. In addition, it has 
been pointed out how an environmental disaster resulting from an attack 
on a ship carrying hazardous cargo would affect an ecosystem by taking 
lives as well as endangering the area for future growth. 100 
On the international level, it has also been pointed out by the Gen-
eral Assembly that Article 100 of UNCLOS requires countries to coop-
erate to the fullest extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas .1°1 
The majority of the acts of piracy occurred in territorial waters or ports 
96. See generally Report of the Secretary-General 2001, supra note 92. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 39. 
100. Id. at 36. 
101. Report of the Secretary-General 2001, supra note 92. at 37; see also UNCLOS, 
supra note 36, at art. 100. 
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of States while the ships were at anchor or berthed (emphasis added). 
The reader will be presented with statistics that are more current but the 
reality of the problem is the same. The IMO had issued guidelines on 
preventing attacks of piracy and armed robbery. These guidelines were 
contained in circulars as requested by the United Nations General As-
sembly in its resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea 54/31 and 
5517 .102 However, these circulars did not address the jurisdictional 
problems that existed then, or today, between the use of traditional 
norms in UNCLOS and the trend toward catastrophic violence. There 
appears to be a gap in the international consensus, i.e., the reality of the 
situation today as compared to what problems existed at an earlier pe-
riod of time (classical forms of piracy vs. organized pirates and terror-
ists). The evolution of international law, utilizing UNCLOS as a 
framework, has become of paramount concern to all countries that rely 
on shipping through international zones and territorial waters (e.g., 
around 40,000 merchant ships sail the globe without any type of regula-
tion).103 Finally, it was pointed out that when drafting regional agree-
ments, attention should be paid to the different characteristics of the 
various regions, as well as to their political environments. 104 The ideal 
would be to forge a consensus before calling on IMO's expertise in the 
elaboration of regional agreements. All states should become involved 
in this preparation. Regional cooperative arrangements or agreements 
should be open not only to the states of the region, but also to those that 
have a substantial interest in navigation in the region. Thus, emergency 
plans in the event of a pollution incident should be put forward as 
well. 105 It was also mentioned that when ships were attacked in port or 
at anchorage, the local municipal law of the coastal state involved 
should have been utilized. 106 However, when acts endangered the safety 
of navigation and occurred on board foreign flag ships while under way 
in the territorial sea, in international straits or in waters beyond the lim-
its of the territorial sea, those acts were frequentl(o not proscribed nor 
punished by the criminal law of the coastal state. 07 It was suggested 
that the SUA Convention and its Protocol could have filled many of the 
jurisdictional gaps by following the approach taken by the 1988 United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-
102. Report of the Secretary-General 2003, supra note 78, at 38-9. 
103. Id. at 36. 
104. Id. at 37. 
105. Id. at 40-1. 
106. Report of the Secretary-General 2001, supra note 92, at 37. 
107. Nathaniel Philbrick, Waterworld, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, at 5. 
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chotropic Substances.108 The delegates at the United Nations agreed that 
enforcement should be within the framework of international law. 109 
The main problem with current international law is that it is evolving 
slowly. 110 In the meantime, certain temporary measures should be per-
mitted in order to prevent catastrophic types of incidents. The trends 
are moving more quickly than the states can plan. Thus, as the reader 
will observe, the reaction to these incidents may act as preventive 
measures in order to deter future acts. 
The types of acts of piracy and terrorism after 9-11 have become 
quite severe. For instance, as seen by all of the statistics set forth in this 
article, piracy attacks have increased over the years (as exemplified by 
charts that have been grovided by a private maritime organization in-
volved with security).1 1 The trend shown in the charts is an increase in 
numbers of acts over the years; the types of "arms used;" "countries 
with over 10 attacks per year;" and of special interest to this article, the 
types of ships that are attacked. Data which indicated that from 1991 to 
2003, oil tankers and tankers LPG were more prone to attack than ever 
with concurrent loss of personal life. 
Therefore, what has evolved from simple economic types of crime 
by unorganized gangs has become a major problem. For example, we 
currently have rebels fighting to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia's 
troubled province of Aceh. "Possibly, the worst scenario that could 
happen is that a passenger ship with thousands of passengers and a large 
crew being rammed by a gas carrier or even a toxic chemical carrier, 
which then releases chemicals in a cloud of vapor over a very crowded 
city."112 
Hong Kong has a vessel arriving and departing about every two 
minutes. They have introduced a new, state-of-the-art monitoring sys-
tem which can track thousands of vessels in real time. However, it is 
not foolproof. In fact, the Chinese Maritime Search and Rescue Center 
and the state-controlled China Ocean Shipping Company conducted a 
joint exercise on June 23, 2004. They used a small boat to simulate a 
suicide bomb attack against a large oil tanker in the South China Sea. 
The exercise seemed to be based on a past attack against the French 
tanker Limburg, off Yemen, on October 6, 2002. China increasingly re-
lies on oil imports from the Middle East and, as a result, needs to pro-
108. Report of the Secretary-General 2001, supra note 92, at 41. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 35 
112. Id. 
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tect commercial sea lanes. 113 Therefore, it is safe to say that we can 
have "terrorists seeking so-called soft targets for attacks that could take 
tl).ousands of lives and cripple world trade and provide a powerful sym-
bol of destructiveness"114 according to the Primer: Piracy in Asia. So 
the area in Southeast Asia would appear to be a breeding ground for pi-
rates and terrorists. Keep in mind that two-thirds of the world's cargo, 
and half of its oil imports travel through the Malacca Strait, and that In-
donesia saw more pirate attacks than any other country in the world. 115 
An example of new trends can be provided: 
In March, armed men seized the Indonesian chemical 
tanker Dewi Madrim in the Malacca Strait. They robbed the 
ship, but they also spent an hour steering it through the strait. 
Why? 'There's a very strong possibility that we're looking 
at the equivalent of a flight training school for terrorists,' 
said Dominic Armstrong, a maritime expert for Aegis Secu-
rity in London. The second act or piracy that did not fit the 
usual criminal pattern was the seizure of an oil tanker, the 
Penrider, near Malaysia in August. Pirates attacked the ship 
and took three crew members hostage. The owners paid 
$100,000 for their release, but government officials in Ma-
laysia said the money went not to pirates, but to an Islamic 
guerrilla organization in Indonesia. The accused group, the 
Free Aceh Movement, denied the charge. However, the Free 
Aceh Movement has previously ordered all ships coming 
near the Aceh shore of the Malacca Strait to ask its permis-
sion to pass. 116 
As far as how much damage a ship's explosion could create, two 
interesting points are made by the "Virtual Information Center," 
An explosion in the port of Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 
1917 gives a clue. A French ship, the Mont Blanc, carrying 
munitions for the W estem Front, collided near Halifax with 
113. Keith Bradsher, China: Guarding Against Suicide Boats, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2004, atA6. 
114. Id. 
115. See USCINCAP Virtual Information Center, Primer: Piracy in Asia, 24 (Oct. 31, 
2003), available at http://www.secure-marine.com/piracy_update.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 
2004) [hereinafter Primer]. 
116. Id. at 24. 
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the merchant ship Imo on Dec. 6, 1917. The impact set off 
the Mont Blanc's powder, killing 1,900 people immediately 
in the small Canadian town. There were 9,000 injuries, and 
almost the entire northern part of the town, more than 300 
acres[-] sic was destroyed. During World War II, two muni-
tions carriers, the Bryant and Quinalt Victory, exploded 
dockside at a naval port in San Francisco Bay. More than 
300 crew members and dock workers died. The University 
of California's seismograph measured the blast as a small 
earthquake, equal to 5,000 tons of dynamite. That is more or 
less the power of the atomic bomb used on Hiroshima. A 
similar incident in a densely populated port city like New 
York is the Coast Guard's worst nightmare. Has there ever 
been a suicide bombing by ship? The tactic was used against 
pirates, when, in 1804, the new U.S. Navy was besieging the 
port of Tripoli to suppress North African piracy. Commo-
dore Edward Preble's gunships proved ineffective against 
Tripoli's massive city walls, so he ordered the USS Intrepid 
to sail up to the city's fortress packed with explosives. Mas-
ter Commandant Richard Somers and 12 volunteers set out in 
fog on the evening of Sept. 4, 1804. Suddenly, their ship 
blew up well short of its target. All of the American seamen 
were killed. No one discovered why the ship blew up, but 
Preble insisted his men had done it themselves to avoid cap-
ture. If so, they were the sea's first suicide bombers.117 
As the reader will recall, the IMB "said attacks on ships had tripled 
in the past 10 years, with 103 assaults in the first three months of this 
year (2003)."118 The problem is that nobody seems to know what the 
strategic intentions of terrorists groups are with relationship to shipping. 
Naturally the security of ports and ships has been increased in the 
United States and other maritime countries. Apparently, what could 
happen is that the pirates and the terrorists could join hands in their at-
tempts to create or disrupt Asian trade by scuttling "large ships in one or 
more of the three narrow straits, Malacca, Sunda and Lombok, along the 
southern edge of the South China Sea," thereby "forcing ships to sail 
much longer and more costly distances around Australia as they ply be-
tween East and South Asia. 119 
117. Primer, supra note 115, at 24. 
118. Id. at 26. 
119. Keith Bradsher, China: Guarding Against Suicide Boats, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
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In order to understand the possible environmental impact to our 
oceans due to attacks by pirates and terrorists, it is necessary to review 
the disastrous effects of chemical and oil spills. 
V. THE EFFECT OF CHEMICAL AND OIL SPILLS ON OUR GLOBAL 
WATERS 
Rachel Carson 120 asserted "that one of the most basic human rights 
must surely be the 'right of the citizen to be secure in his own home 
against the intrusion of poisons applied by other persons."' She further 
goes on to state "[t]hrough ignorance, greed, and negligence, govern-
ment had allowed 'poisonous and biologically potent chemicals' to fall 
indiscriminately into the hands of persons largely or wholly ignorant of 
their potentials for harm."121 Ms. Carson could never have anticipated 
that pirates or terrorists would overtake vessels laden with oil and/ or 
chemicals and negligently or intentionally contaminate our waters. 
However, her concern over the impact of chemicals in the wrong hands 
is analogous to the frightening issues of our day that are articulated in 
this paper. 
Our oceans are replete with a wide array of saltwater ecosystems 
which "exist where streams and rivers meet the sea and where tides and 
coastal currents mix."122 These ecosystems provide us with ecological 
and economic means that are immeasurable. For example, about two-
thirds of America's commercial fish and shellfish utilize these ecosys-
tems for spawning grounds and nurseries. 123 But these ecosystems are 
at risk from mounting environmental changes stemming from pollution, 
land and resource use, invasive species, climate change, and extreme 
events. 124 Since over fifty percent of America's population resides 
within fifty miles of the coastline, a major environmental collision 
would be disastrous. 125 This section of the article will focus on the en-
vironmental threats to marine ecosystems as a result of oil, and/or 
chemical spills. 
Oil spills on the world's oceans greatly contribute to the major 
2004, at A6. 
120. Primer, supra note 115, at 23. 
121. Id. 
122. NATIONAL CENTERS FOR COASTAL OCEAN SCIENCE, COASTAL OCEANS, at 
http://www.nccos.noaa.gov I ecosystems/ coastal ocean/ coastalocean.html (last visited Nov. 
16, 2004) [hereinafter NCCOS]. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
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threat facing the environment. 126 It is estimated about 75 million gal-
lons of petroleum find their way into North America's oceans every 
year. 127 Most oil is transported via tankers. 128 What would be the envi-
ronmental effects were these tankers to collide whether by accident, pi-
racy, or terroristic acts? Could our ecosystem survive a massive oil 
spill? What about a massive chemical spill? And what about the cost to 
remedy the environmental consequences? The following will explore 
the scientific effects of oil spills on our world's waterways. 
Oil spilled into waterways has significant chemical effects on ma-
rine environment. 129 Each of these components could independently or 
collectively cause a host of problems. 13° For example, spilled crude oil 
could burn resulting in atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide gas and 
acid rain, which adds greatly to issues of global warming. 131 Other is-
sues of import arise with the less dense components of the spilled oil. 
These more volatile components evaporate and react with sunlight and 
oxygen to form greenhouse and acid gasses that are quite similar to 
those discussed from combustion of oil. 132 The heavier fractions of the 
crude oil form a mixture called "mousse," which either washes up on 
shore or sinks to the bottom of the water. 133 This "mousse" could easily 
wreak havoc on the habitat of many sensitive as well as less sensitive 
organisms, upsetting the natural food chain. 134 Still, other oil may be 
degraded into less complex molecules through a chemical reaction in-
duced by sunlight or bacteria. 135 Although less harmful, this process 
contributes to the overall effects resulting from an oil spill. 
As stated, oil spills are responsible for a vast array of environ-
mental harms. Wildlife, especially seabirds as well as marine mammals 
are susceptible. 136 However, organisms in the ocean as well as near 
coastal areas, will surely suffer ill effects. These marine organisms are 
126. See NCCOS, supra note 122. 
127. Nancy Rabalais, Oil in the Sea, available at 
http://www.issues.org/issues/20.l/rabalais.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2004). 
128. Id. 
129. ENERGY FACT SHEET: OIL SPILLS (1993), available at 
http://www.iclei.org/EFACTS/OILSPILL.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2004) [hereinafter En-
ergy Fact Sheet]. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. See Id. 
134. Energy Fact Sheet, supra note 129. The spill can also leak into fresh ground water 
if it occurred close enough to a coastline. Id. 
135. Rabalais, supra note 127. 
136. Primer, supra note 115. 
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endangered by oil in three different ways: by poisoning after ingestion, 
by coming in direct contact, and by destroying entire habitats. 137 
Several examples of the oil's impact will be visited. Fish, known 
as a larger creature in marine life, ingest large quantities of oil through 
their gills and can be killed on impact. 138 If they survive their first en-
counter with oil, their reproductive system may be inhibited or inter-
rupted, resulting in a new generation of deformed offspring. 139 More 
sluggish species such as slow moving shellfish are particularly suscepti-
ble to ill effects because they can not break away from the thick oil. 140 
Another example of an ill fated species is that of marine mammals and 
birds. When in direct contact with oil slicks these species, to their det-
riment, ingest a significant amount of oil, and can also be killed by di-
rect exposure. 141 Oil clogs a bird's feathers rendering the bird unable to 
fly and eradicating the capability of a bird's feathers to maintain a warm 
temperature: making it utterly helpless. 142 The oil also may cause a 
bird's feathers to become so heavy that the bird sinks and drowns. 143 
Once wildlife has been adversely affected due to oil contamination 
it may be possible to rehabilitate some species.144 Although some spe-
cies can be helped, the harmful environmental effects might be long 
lasting and long reaching. For example, oiled fish could lead to imme-
diate contamination of a food source and a reduction in reproductive 
ability through disruption of normal reproductive cycle. 145 
One would be remiss to speak to the issue of oil spills without ad-
dressing the infamous 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William 
Sound, Alaska. 146 On March 24, 1989 the tanker Exxon Valdez rup-
tured its tank causing the largest oil spill in the history of the United 
137. Energy Fact Sheet, supra note 129. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. The negative effects of oil ingestion by micro-organisms such as plankton are 
not fully understood. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Energy Fact Sheet, supra note 129. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Effects of Oil on Wildlife, Tri-State Bird Rescue & Research, Inc., available at 
http://www.tristatebird.org/oilspill/effects_of_oil.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2004). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. The gastrointestinal tract, pancreas and liver are also at risk. For example birds 
may injure their gastrointestinal tracts while attempting to clean their feathers through 
preening. These damaged birds are then incapable of proper digestion eventually leading to 
debilitation and weakness. At this point their immune systems may become compromised. 
Id. 
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States. 147 The environmental effects were devastating. About eleven 
million gallons of crude oil spilled into an extremely sensitive ecosys-
tem.148 Almost five months later, the oil had navigated so that more 
than twelve hundred miles of shoreline were affected. 149 The effects of 
the spill were instantaneous, killing countless birds, fish and marine 
mammals. 150 Serious damage was done to many of the natural re-
sources of the area. 151 The scene was a plethora of ecosystem destruc-
tion. "Dead fish lay on the shore, birds were covered . . . in oil and un-
able to fly."152 Sea birds by the thousands were killed, as well as "300 
harbor seals, and 250 bald eagles."153 Killer whales were also killed. 154 
Even after costly and massive clean up efforts, and along with the 
passage of years, the negative environmental impact lingers. Because 
an ecosystem is a synergistic dependent system, where one living thing 
depends on another, the long lasting effects of this type of impact are 
gargantuan. When fish are covered in oil and die, other species are in-
fluenced. For example, dead fish result in less food for the seals that eat 
them. 155 As the seals diminish in quantity there is less food for orcas 
that eat seals to survive. One could continue up the chain to humans 
who eat seal meat for sustenance. 156 In addition to the physical harm, 
humans were also victim to adverse economic consequences by envi-
ronmental disasters. Many who were fishermen suffered a loss of in-
come in the aftermath of this catastrophic oil spill. Thus the conse-
quences were both environmental and economic in nature. 157 
Water quality and ecosystem changes are also adversely affected 
by chemicals and toxins occurring from either intentional or uninten-
tional ocean dumping. 158 Heavy metals as well as other toxic chemicals 
14 7. Prince William Sound: An Ecosystem in Transition, available at 
http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/spotlight/spotlight.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2004 ). 
148. Christine Cartwright, Natural Resource Damage Assessment: The Exxon Valdez 
Oil Spill and Its Implications, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 451 ( 1991 ). 
149. Id. The oil spill occurred in l~ss than five hours. Id. 
150. Id. at 457. 
151. Id. at 451. 
152. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: The Aftermath, available at 
http://nj.essortment.com/exxonvaldezoil_regp.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2004). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. The spill killed 250,000 sea birds. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. See Exxon Valdez, supra note 152. 
158. Id. With respect to overall economic expenditure, more than two billion dollars 
have been spent to clean up Prince William Sound. Id. 
34
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 1 [2004], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss1/2
2004] The Problem of Unilateral Action to Prevent Terrorism 35 
have properties that cause bioaccumulating in many marine species. 159 
Those not killed by toxic bioaccumulation have been killed due to oxy-
gen depletion. 160 Those who survive may be diseased: an impact felt by 
humans as well as the habitat. 
Toxic substances may be carcinogenic, mutagenic and terato-
genic.161 Introduction of these toxic substances or pollutants into the 
oceans is increasing in quantities significant enough to bring about de-
structive effects on resources and our environment. 162 As stated previ-
ously, some of these chemicals are bioaccumulated in species effectuat-
ing a change in habitat. 163 A classic example of a chemical that is 
lethal, mainly due to its bioaccumulation properties, is DDT. DDT164 
has a half-life165 of 15 years. 166 The impact of 100 kg (kilograms) of 
DDT is that after 100 years, over a kilogram of DDT will linger in the 
environment. 167 This phenomenon is of great consequence because 
through the processes of bioaccumulation and biomagnification, 168 a 
large amount of DDT will end up in the bodies of organisms. 169 DDT is 
a very stable compound and is quite fat soluble. It is metabolized 
slowly and stored in the fatty tissues. 170 
Although one may wonder why ocean dumping or pollution should 
cause such deleterious effects, it is because the dilution factor is not suf-
ficient to override the significant toxic impact. It is not necessarily the 
ocean waters, where the point of first impact may occur, that becomes 
159. Bioaccumulation & Biomagnification, at 
http://www.marietta.edu/-biol/102/2bioma95.html (last visited on June. 15, 2004). The 
term bio-accumulation speaks to how pollutants enter a food chain. The pollutant increases 
in concentration from the environment to the first organism in a food chain. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Vaclav K. Mejstrik, The Oceans: Exploitation of Resources and Pollution, avail-
able at http://business.hol.gr/bio/HTML/PUBSNOL3/jg-mej.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 
2004). 
163. Id. It is estimated these pollutants stay around for decades. Id. 
164. Bioaccumulation & Biomagnification, supra note 159 ("DDT stands for dichloro 
dipheyny trichlorethane."). See also DDT- A Banned Insecticide, available at 
http://www.chelationtherapyonline.com/technical/p86.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
165. The half-life of a chemical defines the rate at which it will decay. The number 
assigned ranges from 0-255. See generally Chemical Half Life, at 
http://www.doiuble.co.nz/creatures/genetics/halflife.htm (last visited on Nov. 22, 2004) 
("The higher the number, the longer it takes the chemical to drop down to zero."). 
166. See Bioaccumulation & Biomagnification, supra note 159. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. Biomagnification is defined as "an increase in concentration of a pollutant 
from one link in a food chain to another." Id. 
170. See Bioaccumulation & Biomagnification, supra note 159. 
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the final resting ground for toxic implantation. Rather, many wastes are 
transported to coastal areas where coastal ecosystems are degraded. 171 
Chronic pollution is produced by many other sources such as dredging, 
filling, paving, construction of terminals, factory roads, and other types 
of urbanization. Coastal waters also receive polluting substances 
through river discharges and coastal out-falls. 172 The introduction of 
non-native species into coastal ecosystems by chemical spills will cer-
tainly add to biological pollution: a result our societal environment will 
most likely not be able to sustain for very long. 
Even under optimum pristine conditions, the sea is not a bottom-
less supplier of food and other resources. A terroristic or piracy attack 
leading to oil or chemical spills could lead to disastrous consequences 
traveling up the entire food chain. Environmental groups, cognizant of 
the deleterious effects of chemical spills or dumping, led a movement 
which amended the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act ·of 
1972 with the passing of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act in 1988.173 This 
Act is utilized to curb ocean dumping by cruise ships in the waters of 
the United States. 174 However, neither this Act nor any other will pro-
tect against illicit dumping-inadvertent or deliberate-by pirates, ter-
rorists, or any other person operating with sinister goals. What if terror-
ists or pirates take over a ship laden with chemicals and are not 
competent seamen? What if they intentionally mishandle the ship? 
What if their ultimate goal is to scuttle the ship into an ocean oil rig? 
The environmental effects of such villainy would be devastating. 
The introduction of foreign systems such as chemicals into our 
oceans has serious impacts on marine life and environment. 175 Toxic 
chemicals in water can bioaccumulate in species leading to reduced fish 
populations. Additionally, pathogens introduced can cause disease not 
only in fish, but in humans who later consume contaminated fish. 176 
171. See UNEP, An Overview of Land Based Sources of Marine Pollution, at 
http://www.cep.unep.org/issues/lbsp.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2004). 
172. See Mejstrik, supra note 162. These coastal waters and ecosystems are highly fer-
tile ground for biological activity and hence are of great import to public health and need. 
Id. 
173. Ocean Dumping Ban Act, Pub. L. No. 100-688(1988) (amending Marine Protec-
tion, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. 1401 et. seq.(1972)). 
174. Charles B. Anderson, Ocean Dumping and the Marine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act, 1 LOY. MAR. L.J. 79 (2002). 
175. See id. 
176. Id. at 81; see also Consumer Factsheet on: Polychlorinated Biphenyls, at 
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/contaminants/dw_contamfs/pcbs.html (last visited Nov. 24, 
2004). An example of a toxic chemical would be PCBs (Polychlorinated Biphenyls). Id. 
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Chemical and biological changes are also natural consequences. These 
changes include "oxygen depletion, accelerated growth of algae and 
plankton (so-called 'red tides'), and PH imbalances."177 Furthermore, 
physical effects can cause suffocation of bottom dwelling organisms or 
loss of marine life from suspended solids in the water column.178 
Data from the Office of U.S. Customs indicates that 3.2 billion 
pounds of pesticide products were in transit between 1997-2000. 179 
This translates into about 45 tons of chemicals per hour. It is estimated 
that 65 million pounds of pesticides exported from the U.S. were for-
bidden for use in the U.S. 180 In fact, products considered not acceptable 
for domestic use may be exported to other countries, placing these po-
tentially harmful chemicals in global waterways. 181 These extremely 
hazardous chemicals would wreak environmental havoc on the ecosys-
tem were they to be discharged accidentally into our waters. Intentional 
use of these and other chemicals (such as a dirty bomb) for terroristic 
activities would have similar impacts. Therefore, measures must be 
taken to ensure chemicals carried on tankers are in containers that can 
sustain the strongest of blows. 
VI. PREVENTION AND ENFORCEMENT-Two CONCEPTS THAT MAY 
PRESENT CONFLICTS OF NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 
The goal of all nations is to prevent piracy and terrorism before the 
acts, themselves, occur. As the reader has observed, areas such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore have increased tracking systems with regard to 
ships in their ports. Other nations have done the same. However, it 
may be necessary to increase patrols of naval vessels throughout the in-
ternational straits and possibly even territorial waters. One of the prob-
lems is that UNCLOS was written at a time when terrorism was not a 
These organic chemicals were put to many uses in the U.S., e.g. as pesticides. Id. These 
chemicals are so dangerous that the EPA has set the MCL (Maximum Contaminant Level) 
at 0.5 ppb (parts per billion). Id. This is the lowest level to which it is deemed safe for in-
gestion by humans. Id. There are short-term as well as long-term health effects as a result 
of exposure. Id. Short term effects include acne-like eruptions, pigmentation of the skin, 
hearing and vision problems and spasms. Id. Long term PCBs can cause throat and gastro-
intestinal tract irritation, changes in liver function and even cancer. Id. 
177. Anderson, supra note 174, at 81. Economic losses, as discussed earlier, are also a 
by-product of this type of foreign contamination. Id. 
178. Id. Death occurs by ingestion. Id. 
179. Carl Smith, Pesticide Exports from U.S. Ports, 1997-2000, 7 INT'L J. 
OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 266 (2001), available at 
http://www.fasenet.org/pesticide_report97-00.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2004). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
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concern, and most forms of piracy that it addressed had gone out of 
fashion in the late 1800s, early 1900s. However, UNCLOS and cus-
tomary law are developing even as this article is written. The frame-
work is there through various treaties and regional agreements. The 
question is: just how far can a country, such as the United States, pro-
ceed in order to protect itself as well as the world's commercial ship-
ping; and, by doing so, thereby preventing and enforcing anti-
piracy/terrorism laws? In order to answer this question of pro-activity, 
one must first look at what is being done currently (i.e., in practice). 
A. Piracy in Ports 
Recently, a private Dutch security company-Secure-Ship-
developed a high-voltage electric fence that can be mounted around a 
ship deck. 182 "Crew members can activate port and/or starboard zones, 
allowing work to take place on one side of the ship while the fence is 
charged on the other."183 "The electric fence delivers a 9,000-volt 
shock at any point of contact-a painful but not deadly charge."184 The 
positive point is that it represents an "anti-boarding device [that] 
will ... prevent stowaways, deter[] illegal immigration and possibly 
thwart[] would-be terrorists."185 "However, the presence of electrically 
charged wires means the system cannot be used on oil tankers or other 
ships carrying heavily flammable materials."186 Thus, this system can-
not prevent all potential acts of terrorism. 187 
The second type of security system is called "ShipLoc." 188 "Ship-
Loc is an inexpensive satellite tracking system, which allows shipping 
companies armed with only a personal computer with Internet access to 
monitor the exact location of their vessels."189 It can facilitate an anti-
hijacking wall by giving an "independent and precise location of ships 
at regular intervals."190 What happens is that crews may, "in the case of 
182. International Chamber of Commerce, Electric Fence for Ships Steps up Fight 
Against Pirates, (Jan. 23, 2003), at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2003/stories/electric_fence.asp (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Electric Fence]. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. quoting Captain Pottengal Mukundan. 
186. Electric Fence, supra note 182. 
187. Id. 
188. International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Commercial Crime Services: The /MB 
Piracy Reporting Centre at http://www.iccwbo.org/ccs/menu_imb_piracy.asp (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2004) [hereinafter /CC Commercial Crime Services]. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
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danger ... activate an alarm button that automatically sends, a message to 
the ship owner and to competent authorities."191 Apparently it is not 
very costly, and is fully compliant with the IMO regulation concerning 
ship security alert systems that was adopted during a diplomatic confer-
ence in December 2002, SOLAS XXI-2-0. 192 The regulation itself is 
expected to go into place as of July 2004. 193 It "requires ships of over 
500 GT (gross tons) to be equipped with an alarm system in order to re-
enforce ship security."194 
The IMO Draft Code of Practice for the Investigation of the 
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, of course, defines 
piracy under article 101 of UNCLOS. Moreover, the Draft Code also 
creates a separate crime called "'Armed robbery against ships,' [which] 
means any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depreda-
tion, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship 
or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's ju-
risdiction over such offences."195 
It is now apparent that these acts of violence must be prevented in 
order to keep shipping lanes open. The major commercial traffic occurs 
in international straits. The international community has reached a con-
sensus on the status of straits in UNCLOS. The consensus, together 
with its interplay on environmental expectations agreed upon by the in-
ternational community in UN CLOS will now be presented so that the 
reader can further appreciate the gaps that exist between conventional 
wisdom and the reality of how these violent acts affect pro-action and 
enforcement of outdated standards. 
The point is that UNCLOS and other agreed upon conventions and 
protocols are going to have to evolve at a more rapid pace from the cur-
rent framework. 
B. Acts of Piracy/Terrorism in International Straits 
The basic problem presented in the article is: should warships that 
proceed through international straits be permitted to attack unilaterally, 
pirates/terrorists that are outside the "international" aspect of the strait 
and are in territorial waters? As was mentioned in our jurisdictional 
discussion, "the coastal state exercises exclusive jurisdiction over its in-
191. See ICC Commercial Crime Services, supra note 188. 
192. Id. 
193. See id. 
194. Id. 
195. Draft Code, supra note 39, at annex~~ 2.1-2.2. 
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ternal waters (e.g., ports and harbors)."196 
As one moves seaward from the baseline, the state exer-
cises almost total jurisdiction over its territorial sea, with the 
one exception of the doctrine of innocent passage. 
Innocent passage is defined by UNCLOS at Article 19, 
as follows: 
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to 
the peace, good · order or security of the coastal state. Such 
Passage shall take place in conformity with this convention 
and with other rules of international law. 2. Passage of a for-
eign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal state if in the territorial 
sea it engages in any of the following activities: (h) any act 
of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; 
(I) any fishing activities; (j) the carrying out of research or 
survey activities ... (1) any other activity not having a direct 
bearing on passage. 
A limited area of jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea 
as we move further seaward from a baseline of the coastal 
state is the contiguous zone. The contiguous zone exists so 
that a state may exercise necessary control over issues such 
as pollution, navigation, customs, and sanitation. This zone 
is still considered part of the high seas. 
The high seas have traditionally been open to all states 
in order to preserve international shipping and commerce. 197 
International straits are also preserved for international com-
merce and are therefore open to all nations. The flow of in-
ternational commerce is at the heart of all maritime conven-
tions. Commerce must be able to flow freely, uninhibited, 
without danger to life and limb and without fear of wide-
spread environmental contamination. 198 
Coastal states also have the right to protect themselves and take 
measures in order to avoid pollution arising from maritime casualties 
196. Barry Hart Dubner, On the Interplay of International Law of the Sea and the Pre-
vention of Maritime Pollution-How Far Can a State Proceed in Protecting Itself From 
Conflicting Norms in International Law 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 137, 141 (1998). 
197. Id .. 
198. Dubner, supra note 75 at 141-43. 
40
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 32, No. 1 [2004], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol32/iss1/2
2004] The Problem of Unilateral Action to Prevent Terrorism 41 
under Article 221 of UN CLOS, which concerns measures to avoid pol-
lution arising from maritime casualties, as follows: 
nothing in this Part shall prejudice the right of States, pursu-
ant to international law, both customary and conventional, to 
take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea propor-
tionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their 
coastline or related interest, including fishing, from pollution 
or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or 
acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be ex-
pected to result in major harmful consequences. 199 
Of course, we are dealing with international straits. International 
straits can be defined as: 
natural waterways used for international navigation between 
two bodies of land which may be continental land masses, a 
continental land mass and an island, or even two islands, ir-
respective of the size, width and length of the waterway. 
Since these straits are physically part of the oceans, they may 
comprise internal waters, territorial seas, exclusive economic 
zones and even areas of high seas. This being the case, third 
states would appear to enjoy a right of innocent passage in 
the portion which belongs to the territorial sea and the free-
dom of navigation in the other portions of the strait. This is 
the situation which seems to prevail in straits which, 
throughout their length, are wider than 24 nautical miles and 
therefore encompass an area of exclusive economic zone. 
Where, however, the breadth of the international strait is less 
than 24 nautical miles at some point within its length, a spe-
cial passage regime appears necessary (emphasis added). 
Certain treaty provisions may govern navigational use 
of some international straits in whole or in part.20° For ex-
ample, the Bosporus is regulated by the 1936 Montreux 
Convention relating to the Turkish straits.201 However, not 
all straits are regulated by treaties. Some are geographic in 
nature and fall within one or more of the legal regimes iden-
199. UNCLOS, supra note 36, at art. 221. 
200. Id. at 148. 
201. Id. 
41
Diaz and Dubner: On The Problem of Utilizing Unilateral Action To Prevent Acts Of
Published by SURFACE, 2004
42 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 32:1 
tified in [UNCLOS]. 
There are five different straits used for international 
navigation that are identified by [UNCLOS], each with a dis-
tinct legal regime. According to the State Department inter-
pretation, the regime of innocent passage, rather than transit 
passage, applies in straits used for international navigation 
that connect parts of the high seas or exclusive economic 
zones with the territorial sea of a coastal state. There shall be 
no suspension of innocent passage through such straits.202 
According to UNCLOS, "passage" means "navigation through the 
territorial sea for the purpose of either traversing that sea without enter-
ing internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside inter-
nal waters; or proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such 
roadstead or port facility."203 In addition: 
under Article 34( 1 ), the regime of passage through interna-
tional straits does not affect the legal status of the waters or 
the sovereignty or jurisdiction of the states bordering the 
straits. However, states bordering these straits are required 
to exercise their sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance 
with Part III and other rules of international law. States bor-
dering straits must not impede the right of innocent passage. 
Assuming that these vessels are proceeding in what is 
termed 'innocent passage' under customary and/or conven-
tional treaty law, there are permissible restrictions on passage 
(e.g., restrictions set up for navigational safety and environ-
mental protection). Under international law, the restrictions 
have to be reasonable and necessary and cannot have the 
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent 
passage. The restrictions cannot discriminate, in form or 
substance, against ships of any states or those carrying car-
goes, to, from, or on behalf of any state. The coastal state 
may, where navigational safety dictates, require foreign ships 
exercising the right of innocent passage to utilize designated 
sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. Article 21 further 
states that the coastal state has the power to adopt certain 
laws and regulations regarding innocent passage through the 
202. Dubner, supra note 196, at 148. 
203. Id. at 152. 
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territorial sea with respect to eight subject areas, one of 
which is the preservation of the environment of the coastal 
state and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution. 
When are straits used for international navigation? The 
decisive criteria for designation as an international strait is its 
geographical location connecting, for example, parts of the 
high seas, and the fact that it is used for international naviga-
tion. Under Article 34( 1) of the Convention, the regime of 
passage through international straits does not affect the legal 
status of these waters (be they 'territorial' or not) under the 
sovereignty or jurisdiction of the coastal states bordering the 
straits. 
Using the Bosporus as an example, the straits known as 
the Turkish Straits connect the Aegean Sea and the Black 
Sea via the Sea of Marmora. 204 The Bosporus connects the 
Black Sea with the Sea of Marmora, while the Dardanelles 
connects the Aegean Sea with the Sea of Marmora. The 
Bosporus is about 17 miles long and varies in width between 
one-third and 2 miles.205 The Dardanelles is about 35 miles 
long, with its width decreasing from four miles at the Aegean 
to about 0.7 miles at its narrowest, and with its depth varying 
from 160 to 320 feet. The Sea of Marmora is about 140 
miles long. The Turkish Straits are governed by the Mon-
treux Convention of July 20, 1936 and fall under the Article 
35(c) exception contained in the Convention. Under the 
Montreux Convention, merchant vessels enjoy complete 
freedom of transit, day or night, regardless of their cargo or 
flag. Piloting and towage are optional. 206 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom on the passage of warships in 
international straits, Articles 29 through 32 (UNCLOS) remind us that if 
a warship passes through territorial waters and disregards any request 
for compliance of a coastal state, "the coastal state may require it to 
leave the territorial sea immediately."207 Also, under Article 31 
(UNCLOS), "the flag state shall bear international responsibility for any 
loss or damage to the coastal state resulting from non-compliance by a 
warship with the laws and regulations of the coastal state concerning 
204. Dubner, supra note 196, at 152. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 154. 
207. UNCLOS, supra note 36, at art. 30. 
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passage through territorial seas."208 
As the reader will observe, there are restrictions on the passage of 
warships through territorial seas of coastal states, even those overlying 
an international strait. The main problem facing the international com-
munity is the potential for horrible loss of life and irrecoverable envi-
ronmental loss on the one hand, and the fact that the consensus regard-
ing unilateral action (especially after the Iraq situation) may make it 
impossible to prevent acts of terror if there are going to be too many re-
strictions on warships in these waters.209 The United States recently en-
tered into an agreement with Panama that provided for the boarding of 
ships on the high seas in support of efforts to stop the trade in deadly 
weapons (nuclear, chemical or biological arms or equipment) and mate-
rials (i.e., the Proliferation Security Initiative).210 The Initiative would 
subject nearly fifteen percent of the world's roughly 50,000 large cargo 
ships to boarding and inspection on short notice. The interesting point 
is that both countries (i.e., United States and Panama), can ask each 
other to board their vessels outside their own territorial waters and to 
seize the cargo IF it turns out to be related to unconventional weapons 
programs. Each state would have two hours to respond to the requests. 
If no response is made, the interdiction may proceed. A New York 
Times article stated, 
With these agreements with Panama and Liberia and the 
support of more than 60 other nations, the U.S. will have the 
ability to seek rapid consent to board ships that represent 
roughly 46 percent of the world's commercial fleet in dead-
weight tons ... Liberia has some 2,000 large cargo ships, that 
is, ships of over 500 dead-weight tons, registered under its 
flag ... Panama has some 5,600. That means that the sun 
never sets on their ships.211 
As the trends show by the types of incidents involved, and the fact 
that the terrorists and pirates are possibly much more organized than in 
the past, unilateral action may be necessary where regional action fails. 
Regional action with regard to stopping piracy is no longer a tremen-
dous problem because, as the risk of terrorism has increased, it would 
208. UNCLOS, supra note 36, at art. 31. 
209. Dubner, supra note 196, at 160-61. 
210. Judith Miller, Panama Joins Accord to Stem Ships' Transport of Illicit Arms, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 11, 2004, at Al 1 (internal quotations omitted). 
211. Id. 
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seem that the various actions that coastal states have taken, with respect 
to the various commercial shipping lanes, should stop or eliminate the 
amount of piracy conducted by individuals who are not organized. 
Organized theft (such as through phantom ships) has not been of 
major importance other than economic loss. The main concern with this 
article is: how does the international community address the potential 
loss of life and damage to the environment from organized pirates act-
ing in consort with terrorists? 
On closer examination, one would think that organized pirates 
would not want to have anything to do with terrorists because it would 
only mean that there would be stronger outrage/condemnation and en-
forcement by the international community which, in tum, could lead to 
annihilation of the pirates. Terrorists are not interested in financial gain 
(i.e., they are not committing these acts of terrorism for financial re-
ward) other than to try to raise monies to increase the voracity and 
numbers of acts of terrorism. So, it does not seem that any organized 
pirate worth his/her salt would be interested in working with terrorists, 
although that has been a concern. With the increase in regional coop-
eration among the various states in Southeast Asia, it would seem that 
the acts of piracy should be reduced in the future. However, this really 
does not address the potential for acts of terrorism, and the response that 
should be consented/acquiesced to by the international community. 
The idea that humanitarian intervention should be a distinct legal 
basis for using force, with fixed criteria .or principals in advance govern-
ing legitimate appeal to the right, is not a new one.212 
One view is that the case for codifying a right of humanitarian in-
tervention rests on: a normative attitude toward such interventions, a 
view about the impact of codification on the legitimacy of international 
law, a position concerning the role of formalization in curbing abuses, 
and a view about the relative benefits of clarity versus open-endedness 
in the evolution of international legal norms.213 
Thus, the argument for a maritime power, such as the United 
States, policing international straits/pathways for international com-
merce without the consent of the coastal states would seem to be a vio-
lation of international law, unless the breach is "excusable" because of 
protection against the probable occurrence of severe loss of human life 
(humanitarian intervention). Such intervention is technically illegal un-
der the rules of the UN Charter, "but may be morally and politically jus-
212. BARRY E. CARTER ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1081 (Aspen 4th ed. 2003). 
213. Id. at 1083. 
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tified in certain exceptional cases. In short, it is a violation of the Char-
ter for which states are unlikely to be condemned or punished .... "214 
So, a state might argue that their military action is "lawful" - as having 
a legal basis within the normative framework of international law.215 
As far as unilateral and environmental action is concerned, "[t]he 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development addressed the 
acceptability of unilateral actions relating to extraterritorial environ-
mental problems that have effects on trade."216 
Principle 12 provides as follows: 
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and 
open international economic system that would lead to eco-
nomic growth and sustainable development in all countries, 
to better address the problems of environmental degradation. 
Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should 
not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimi-
nation or a disguised restriction on international trade. Uni-
lateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside 
the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. 
Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global 
environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based 
on an international consensus.217 
Any unilateral action should be utilized to promote a positive and 
reasonable community response to a particular problem, especially in 
furtherance of treaty obligations. There is no question that the use of 
unilateral action poses problems with the international community as a 
whole, especially after the Iraqi situation. One of the benefits of taking 
unilateral action is that it will make the international community aware 
of the particular problems in one state that could affect other states as 
well. Speed and quickness of action may be the only way to prevent 
loss of human life and horrendous damage to the environment. The 
drawback is that as long as the acts affect only a local regional area, the 
214. Id. at 1082. 
215. See id. 
216. EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, 
1065 (Aspen Law & Business 1998). 
217. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, annex I, at princ. 12, A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. 1) 
last updated Jan. 12, 2000, available at 
http://www.un.org/ documents/ gal confl 51/aconfl5126-1 annex l.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 
2005). 
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international community may not be interested in creating a new legal 
regime or approach. The point is that these acts may cause a chain reac-
tion which will affect the entire international community. 
There are certain aspects or elements of unilateral action that are 
apparently acceptable in the international community. For example, if 
the unilateral action is reasonable under the circumstances and if the 
length of the action is temporary as opposed to permanent, temporary 
action might be acceptable, whereas a permanent blockade would not. 
If warships, for example, continue to go through territorial waters with-
out permission, this would be a permanent abuse over a period of time. 
The unilateral action probably would be more acceptable if nations ac-
quiesce (e.g., say nothing about the action for as long as it goes on) be-
cause, while they do not want to agree to permit warships to travel 
through internal waters, they understand that it might be necessary to do 
so this one time in order to keep commercial routes open for navigation. 
Also, the state utilizing this type of concept would probably want to get 
affirmative permission from as many international organizations, (e.g., 
the Organization of American States) in order to back up its assertion 
that the unilateral action is necessary. Regional action should be taken 
to prevent terrorist bombings in vital commercial and environmental ar-
eas. However, it may be necessary for other states to assist on a limited 
basis. Quick response time would seem of paramount importance. 
An argument can be made by the maritime powers that by protect-
ing the shipping routes from terrorists, they are protecting the interna-
tional community's lifelines. Again, the problem is one of perception. 
How much stretching of traditional concepts of international law will be 
necessary in order to achieve free commercial navigation in these inter-
national waters? 
CONCLUSION 
Terrorists are planning to cause havoc in certain areas of the world. 
It has been shown that at least one ship was hijacked for the purpose of 
training terrorists on how to pilot a tanker. This is a ship that we know 
about. The question is, how extensive is this type of action at the pre-
sent time? Assuming that the international community believes that the 
acts of terrorism against shipping in international straits means attacks 
against the world community, it is apparent that a pro-active approach 
has to be taken by the international community. 
There are degrees of acceptability of unilateral actions. The acts 
have to be reasonable; temporary in nature; for a very specific purpose 
(i.e., to protect against severe loss of human life and/or environmental 
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catastrophe); and, either acquiesced in, or with affirmative approval of 
these actions by states that cannot afford-for either political or eco-
nomical reasons-to assist the intervening states. It all depends on how 
much of a heavy hand is used in these situations. When one compares 
the concept of state sovereignty with the alternative scenarios in these 
types of situations, a temporary infringement will surely be of para-
mount necessity. 
It is suggested in this article that, in addition to regional action, it 
will be necessary for maritime nations to patrol those areas that are 
heavily ridden with international outlaws. There are numerous statistics 
showing where these areas are located. There has been regional action 
in certain areas (e.g., Singapore). However, the very nature of the ex-
tensive problems, both geographical and political, makes it difficult to 
request certain coastal states, especially with populations that may not 
be as sympathetic toward the goals of prevention, to take action on a 
municipal level in order to prevent acts of terrorism. 
Despite what is going on in Iraq, these potential acts of pi-
racy/terrorism pose different problems and should be treated differently 
than should the unilateral intervention by one state into the affairs of 
another. There does not need to be any abuse of international law 
where it is necessary to conduct unilateral incursions into territorial wa-
ters. The intervening state should first attempt to get permission. If 
consent is not forthcoming, then the intervening state's first duty should 
be to protect human life and prevent environmental disaster. Naturally, 
it would be responsible for any damage that it caused the coastal state. 
There are degrees of acceptability of unilateral actions. 
International law is an evolving concept. UNCLOS is an example 
of an international framework which has to evolve with events happen-
ing since the 1982 inception of this convention. Under UNCLOS, the 
crime of piracy occurs on the high seas only. Yet, piracy has been con-
ducted more by organized gangs in internal waters and territorial seas. 
States need to proscribe and enforce their municipal statutes in internal 
waters and territorial seas in order to block these acts and to react, in 
kind, to them. Regional cooperation is currently occurring in certain ar-
eas. 
Under UN CLOS, it is the duty of the coastal states to prevent dam-
ages to their environments as well as loss of life and property due to the 
crime of piracy. By preventing these acts in their territory, they are pre-
venting severe damage to other states. They have a duty to do as much 
as they can and should not be allowed to hide under a shield of sover-
eignty. International straits of passage need to be kept open. Otherwise, 
the international community will be in economic ruin. 
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The crime of terrorism has come to the fore since 9/11. It existed 
prior thereto; however, those past acts were considered "isolated" at 
best. The ferocity with which terrorists act against mankind is startling. 
Terrorists are concerned with destroying life, property and creating 
havoc wherever they deem their acts to be possible and advantageous to 
their "cause." The problem presented is: how do we prevent the acts 
from occurring? What methods are necessary to enforce such preven-
tion? Some authors believe that because acts of terrorism have the po-
tential for catastrophe, certain "norms" in international law will have to 
be "stretched" in order to accommodate states seeking to suppress these 
acts. In looking at the past conduct of certain states, it can be seen that 
some coastal states are either unwilling or unable to suppress acts ofter-
rorism. The problem is that Indonesia and Malaysia are divided by a 
heavily traversed international shipping lane that needs to be kept open. 
Regional cooperation is important and must continue. 
"Alan Chan, whose vessel Petro Ranger was hijacked in 1999 in 
the South China Sea, said vessel attacks in South East Asia arose from a 
serious lack of resources on the part of the Indonesian government, 
which made it impossible for the Indonesian Navy and Police to effec-
tively patrol their extensive coastline. He said the situation was not 
likely to change in the short term, and therefore, there was a continuing 
risk to shipping in Indonesian waters, which includes the Malacca Strait 
- still the most dangerous waters in the world."218 However, it is doubt-
ful whether these states have the wherewithal to keep the shipping mov-
ing safely. What needs to be created as a "norm" by consensus of the 
international community? If a maritime nation is willing to patrol these 
international waters, it should be able to react in all UNCLOS zones 
(preferably with the permission of the coastal states) in order to prevent, 
or respond to, acts of terrorism. 
Finally, international waters and territorial seas should have an-
other layer of jurisdiction for the specific crime of terrorism and/or pi-
racy; namely, reaction zones. The "hot pursuit" doctrine should also be 
extended for those crimes originating in reaction zones as well as for 
those occurring exclusively on the high seas. Are these proposals sub-
ject to abuse by the intervening states? Yes, however, there may be no 
other alternative open in a given situation! Do not think in terms of 
sovereignty; it is a struggle between darkness and light. 
218. ICC Commercial Crime Services, Shipowners Call for Coordinated International 
Sea Patrols (Nov. 23, 2004), at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/menu_2004.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2004). 
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